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We estimate that the euro has increased trade within the eurozone by about 26 per cent and 
trade between the eurozone and outsiders by about 12 per cent on average for the years 2002-
2005 compared to 1995-1998. The percentage increases were smaller for products that were 
exported every year during the sample period than for products that were not, indicating 
significant and substantial effects on the extensive margin of trade. The euro effects were 
concentrated to semi-finished and finished products, in particular to industries with highly 
processed products such as pharmaceuticals and machinery. 
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 1.  Introduction 
Eleven member states of the European Union entered into a currency union on January 1, 
1999.
1 The rates at which their national currencies could be exchanged with one another 
and with the new, common currency – the euro – were irrevocably fixed and the authority 
to conduct a common monetary policy was assumed by the European Central Bank. A 
twelfth member of the European Union, Greece, joined the currency union in 2001. The 
national currencies were replaced as units of accounts by the euro in the beginning of 
2002. 
  Adoption of a common currency reduced trade costs between currency union 
member countries by eliminating the need to engage resources in handling currency 
exchange and hedging. It also reduced nominal exchange rate uncertainty, which affects 
decisions on resource allocation, particularly decisions about trade and foreign direct 
investment.  
  The effect of nominal exchange rate uncertainty on trade has been estimated by a 
great number of studies, mostly in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. The consensus conclusion 
is that nominal (and real) exchange rate uncertainty has very small or no effects on trade, 
see the survey by McKenzie (1999) and the ambitious study by IMF (2004).  More 
recently – and induced by the formation of the European currency union - there has been 
a proliferation of studies that estimate the trade effects of complete elimination of 
nominal exchange rate uncertainty, i.e. of currency unions, employing the gravity model 
of bilateral trade. The seminal study by Rose (2000) using pooled cross-section data for 
other currency unions estimated that a common currency raises trade by 235 per cent. A 
later study by Rose (2001) using panel data that include the formation and dissolution of 
currency unions since 1948 arrived at even higher estimates. As data have been 
accumulating, a growing number of studies have estimated the trade effects of the 
currency union directly. Estimates range anywhere from 4 to 30 per cent and more.  
The recent currency union literature has been surveyed and critically examined by 
Baldwin (2006). He argues that estimates based largely on non-European data are driven 
                                                 
1 We will use the term “currency union” to denote what in official European Union language is called the 
third stage of the European Monetary Union, EMU. It is common to use EMU to mean the currency union, 
but all European Union member states participate in the first, some in the second stages of the EMU and a 
subset of 12 countries also participate in the third stage, the currency union. by countries with peculiar characteristics (“very small, very poor and very open”), are 
fraught with methodological deficiencies and cannot be used to infer effects of the 
European currency union. He also finds that most studies that directly estimate European 
currency union are deficient in a number of ways. 
The present study updates our earlier study (Flam and Nordström, 2003) and 
extends it by estimating effects on the intensive and extensive margins of trade. In 
contrast to most other studies, we explain one-way trade flows between country pairs, not 
two-way bilateral trade. (We will use the terms one-way trade flows and exports 
interchangeably. Exports are of course only one side of the coin.)  By using one-way 
trade flows, we are able to differentiate between effects on trade flows from currency 
union members to non-members from effects on trade flows in the opposite direction. 
Fixed costs are an important feature of exporting in the noted trade model by Melitz 
(2003) and in empirical work by Roberts and Tybout (1997) and others. We expect that 
the presence of such fixed costs leads to increases in the level of existing trade – the 
intensive margin – as well as new trade – the extensive margin – when national 
currencies are replaced by a common currency, as in the model by Baldwin and Taglioni 
(2004). We attempt to determine whether the European currency union has affected the 
extensive margin by estimating effects on the number of product categories traded at a 
high level of disaggregation (the six-digit level of the Harmonized System). We 
furthermore attempt to decompose the total effect into effects on the internal and external 
margins.
2  Finally, we provide estimates of currency union effects for different stages of 
processing and for trade at the industry level. 
 
2.  Currency union effects in the unconditioned trade data 
Our sample of countries consists of 20 countries that are broadly similar in terms of 
economic development. Eleven countries entered the currency union in 1999: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain. Belgium and Luxembourg were treated as a single entity in trade statistics 
until 1998, which leaves us with ten currency union members in the sample. Greece 
                                                 
2 At the time of finishing this paper, we received “Euros and zeros: The common currency effect on trade in 
new goods” by Richard E. Baldwin and Virginia Di Nino. Their paper contains estimates of euro effects on 
the extensive margin on trade, using a different method.  entered the currency union in 2001, but is not included because of potential problems in 
controlling for its late entry. The ten countries in our sample that are not members of the 
currency union are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.  
Figure 1 shows indexed time series for exports in constant prices for the period 
1995-2005. (For reasons to be explained below, trade in energy raw materials and 
products are not included.) We differentiate between three categories: (1) exports 
between currency union members, (2) exports from members to non-members, and (3) 
exports from non-members to members, all relative to trade between the 10 OECD 
countries in the sample that are not members of the currency union. The indices are 
unweighted averages of exports in each category. Thus, they are graphical representations 
of unconditioned panel data. 
 
Figure 1  Total real exports
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Currency union effects seem to be present for exports within the currency union 
and from currency union countries to outside countries. There seems to be no effect on exports from outside to currency union countries. We need of course to control for other 
factors that affect trade to be able to determine if currency union effects really are present 
and how large they are. As will be seen, eyeball econometrics can only take us part of the 
way.  
 
3. The gravity model and data sources 
The gravity model has been used extensively to explain bilateral trade. It can be derived 
from the Ricardian model with a continuum of goods, the Heckscher-Ohlin model with 
more goods than factors and from the Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin model with 
monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale. See Anderson (1979), 
Deardorff (1998) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) respectively. It can also be derived 
from an aggregate expenditure function as in Baldwin (2006). 
    The gravity model states that exports from country A to country B is a function of 
the product of country A and B’s GDP divided by the cost of exporting from A to B. This 
means that exports from A to B depend positively on the product of GDP’s and negatively 
on the trade cost. Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) have demonstrated that the relevant 
trade cost is the cost of exporting from A to B relative to the cost of exporting  from A’s 
competitors to B.  
The trade cost is measured by geographical distance plus many other factors, such 
as border contiguity, shared language and trade policies. In our specification of the 
gravity model, we let bilateral fixed effects capture all time invariant factors affecting 
one-way bilateral trade flows that are not explicitly controlled for. The effects when both 
the exporter and the importer, only the exporter or only the importer participate in the 
currency union are estimated by the use of dummy variables. The effects of participation 
in the Single Market by the exporter, importer or both are controlled for in an analogous 
manner.    
  In most applications of the gravity model, the dependent variable is two-way and 
not one-way bilateral trade. If the dependent variable is two-way trade and trade is 
balanced, it may be of little consequence not to include the bilateral real exchange rate as 
an explanatory variable; a change in the real exchange rate will result in offsetting 
changes in exports and imports. However, real exchange rates with third countries should be included (but never are when bilateral real exchange are excluded). If the dependent 
variable is one-way trade, the volume of trade will depend on the bilateral real exchange 
rate as well as the real exchange rates between competing exporters and the importing 
country. We include real exchange rates among the independent variables and use export 
shares as weights to construct the average real exchange rate between competing 
exporters and the importing country. When currency union effects are estimated at the 
industry level, the relevant industry level export shares are used. 
  The exporter’s GDP is a measure of export supply capacity and the importer’s 
GDP is a measure of import demand. Consideration should also be taken of cyclical 
variation in the elasticity of export supply and import demand, particularly when the 
sample period is relatively short as here. The export supply elasticity tends to be high 
when capacity utilization is low in the exporting country and the import elasticity to be 
high when capacity utilization is high in the importing country. We measure capacity 
utilization by the deviation from the trend of GDP. 
  The common presumption that exchange rate volatility affects trade negatively 
has – as mentioned – little or no support in empirical research. We have not included 
nominal exchange rate volatility as an explanatory variable in the regressions reported 
here after finding that contemporaneous and lagged nominal exchange rate volatility have 
insignificant effects at the 5 per cent level.   
  Table 1 lists explanatory variables that appear in tables. Not listed are controls for 
common year effects and for participation in the Single Market by the exporter, importer 
or both. Data on GDP in constant prices expressed in U.S. dollars were taken from the 
OECD database. Real exchange rates were calculated as the ratio of national producer 
price indices converted into U.S. dollars at current exchange rates with data taken from 
the IMF. Trade data in current U.S. dollars were taken from the UN Comtrade database 
accessed from the WITS portal. They were deflated using national producer price indices 
converted into U.S. dollars at current exchange rates.
3  
                                                 
3 Data on Portugal’s trade in 2005 were not yet available.  Table 1  Variable names  
 
  Dummy variables for  
EZ11p1     exports within eurozone in period 1 (1999-2001) 
EZ11p2     exports within eurozone in period 2 (2002-2005) 
EZ10p1     exports from eurozone to outside countries in period 1 (1999-2001) 
EZ10p2     exports from eurozone to outside countries in period 2 (2002-2005) 
EZ01p1     exports to eurozone from outside countries in period 1 (1999-2001) 
EZ01p2     exports to eurozone from outside countries in period 2 (2002-2005) 
EZ11t(year)     exports within eurozone in (year) 
EZ10t(year)     exports from eurozone to outside countries in (year) 
EZ01t(year)     exports to eurozone from outside countries in (year) 
 Control  variables 
lnRGDPx     log of real GDP of exporter     
lnRGDPm     log of real GDP of importer  
GAPx     deviation from trend growth of exporter 
GAPm     deviation from trend growth of importer 
lnREXRxm     log of real exchange rate between exporter and importer 
lnREXRcm     log of trade-weighted real exchange rate between competing exporters and 
   importer 
lnREXRxm-1     log of one year lagged real exchange rate between exporter and importer 
lnREXRcm-1     log of one year lagged trade-weighted real exchange rate between  




4. Annual currency union effects  
We first estimate annual currency union effects for aggregate trade. Energy raw materials 
and products (ISIC Rev. 3 industries 10-12 and 23) are excluded because substantial price 
effects remain in the deflated trade data, see section 9. We are interested in whether trade 
levels are significantly higher in 1999 and later for trade where the exporter, importer or 
both are members of the currency union than trade levels where both the exporter and 
importer are outsiders. To use terminology borrowed from medical research, we test 
whether trade that has been given a euro treatment is higher in a given year than trade that has not received such treatment. In particular, we are interested in whether levels are 
higher starting in 1999 and whether a trend or pattern can be seen in the estimates.   
  Our sample period is 1995-2005. The starting year was chosen for several 
reasons. First, Austria, Finland and Sweden became members of the EU in 1995. By 
starting in 1995, we do not have to control for the change in their status. Flam and 
Nordström (2003) show that estimates of currency union effects are robust to changes in 
the starting year between 1989 and 1995.
4 Second, the Single Market officially started in 
1993, but was implemented over a period of several years, both before and after 1993. By 
starting in 1995, we reduce the problem of controlling for Single Market effects. We 
nevertheless control for such effects in two ways, by controlling for whether the exporter, 
importer or both participate in the Single Market and by estimating aggregate effects on 
the full country sample (OECD-20) as well as on the sub-sample of EU countries (EU-
13). We thereby also control for any additional effect that EU membership may have over 
and above participation in the Single Market.
5 Third, starting in 1993, goods that are 
subjected to customs clearance in a Single Market country on their way to the final 
destination country are registered as trade both between the source and intermediate 
country and between the intermediate and final destination country. This has led to large 
increases in trade for countries with major ports serving trade between Europe and the 
rest of the world. By beginning the sample period in 1995, we do not need to control for 
the so-called Rotterdam effect. 
  Estimates of annual currency union effects on aggregate exports are shown 








                                                 
4 It should be added that Berger and Nitsch (2005) show that the euro effect on trade is reduced when the 
sample period is made much longer and becomes dwarfed and made insignificant by the time trend when 
the sample period is increased to 1948-2003. 
5 Norway is not a member of the EU but participates in the Single Market. Figure 2  Annual currency union effects 
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   For the EU-13 sample, significant effects are found only for trade within the 
currency union and only in 2003-2005. The benchmark is however quite small and 
therefore relatively susceptible to idiosyncracies; it consists of the six one-way trade 
flows between Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
A different picture emerges when the benchmark is enlarged to also include seven 
non-EU countries. As can be seen in table A1, all estimates for exports between currency 
union members are significant at the 1 per cent level starting in 1999. All estimates for 
exports from members to non-members are significant at the 1 or 5 per cent level starting 
in 1999. The estimate for exports from non-members to members is significant at the 10 
per cent level in 2000 and at the 1 or 5 per cent levels thereafter.   
  We conclude that the estimates for the larger country sample of 20 OECD 
countries – with a larger set of benchmark trade flows – clearly indicate a break in 1999 
or 2000. The estimates for the smaller country sample of 13 EU countries – with a more 
limited benchmark set of trade flows – are not significant in the first years of the currency 
union, but Figure 2 (b) gives a clear impression of a higher level of trade within the 
currency union starting already in 1999.  
Table A2 presents F-values for tests of differences for all pairs of annual currency 
union estimates and for both country samples. Panel (a) shows that trade between 
currency union members are significantly higher at the 1 per cent confidence level for all 
years in the period 1999-2004 compared to 1995-1998 for the OECD-20 country sample. 
It also shows that the currency union effect is increasing; the estimates for 2003-2005 are 
mostly significantly higher than the estimates for 1999-2002. The pattern of significantly 
higher estimates for the currency union period is evident also for exports to and from the 
eurozone, but not as clearly. Panel (b) for the EU-13 country sample shows that trade 
between currency union countries is significantly higher in most years in 1999-2004 
compared to 1995-1998. However, no such pattern can be seen for exports to and from 
the eurozone. 
We conclude that the estimates in Table A1 and tests in Table A2 provide strong 
support for the existence of significant currency union effects. First, estimates for exports 
between currency union members become significant in 1999. It is not surprising that 
effects can be seen already in 1999. The most important decisions on the currency union were taken by the European Council in May of 1998, when it decided which countries 
would be allowed to join and fixed the exchange rates at which national currencies would 
be converted into euros on January 1, 1999. Exchange rates were effectively fixed in 
May, since any changes between May and January could easily be hedged against. 
Second, post-1999 estimates are mostly significantly different from the pre-1999 
estimates. Third, there is a clear tendency that the currency union effects are increasing 
over time as should be expected. 
 
    
5. Average currency union effects  
We next estimate average currency union effects for the years 1999-2001 – which should 
be considered as a transition period – and for the years 2002-2005 – when the effects 
should have taken effect more fully. The estimates for each sub-period show by how 
much treated trade differs from non-treated trade in that period controlling for other 
factors. This amounts to comparing differences between levels of treated trade between 
the pre-currency period and levels in the currency union period with the corresponding 
differences for non-treated trade levels. 
Table 2 shows estimated average currency union effects for aggregate trade 
(excluding energy raw materials and products):  
Table 2   Aggregate currency union effects       
          
          
 OECD-20      EU-13   
          
EZ11p1 0.165***  (18.0%) 0.114***  (12.1%) 
 [0.023]   [0.032]   
EZ11p2 0.232***  (26.1%) 0.187***  (20.6%) 
 [0.024]   [0.037]   
EZ10p1 0.074***  (7.7%)  0.032  (3.3%) 
 [0.020]   [0.033]   
EZ10p2 0.113***  (12.0%) 0.052  (5.3%) 
 [0.022]   [0.039]   
EZ01p1 0.085***  (8.9%)  0.053  (5.3%) 
 [0.025]   [0.033]   
EZ01p2 0.120***  (12.8%) 0.086**  (9.0%) 
 [0.026]      [0.040]   
lnRGDP_i 0.590***      0.603***   
 [0.089]      [0.117]   
lnRGDP_j 1.185***      1.198***   
 [0.078]      [0.104]   
lnREXRij -0.189***      -0.320***   
 [0.066]      [0.113]   
lnREXRkj -0.297***      -0.161   
 [0.094]      [0.153]   
lnREXRij1 -0.605***      -0.595***   
 [0.067]      [0.108]   
lnREXRkj1 0.392***     0.464***   
 [0.091]      [0.157]   
          
Observations 4161      1704   
Number of Panel  380      156   
R-squared 0.53     0.65   
          
OLS, robust standard errors in brackets       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
          
Country pair fixed effects, controls for deviations from trend GDP and common year 
effects  
          
Note: Pecentage change = 100*[exp(estimate)-1]     
 
 
  As can be seen, average currency union effects are estimated to be large. 
Comparing the average for 2002-2005 with the average for 1995-1998, the largest effects 
are estimated for exports within the eurozone, where the effect is 26 per cent in the OECD-20 country sample and 21 per cent in the EU-13 country sample. Substantial 
effect are estimated also for exports from and to the eurozone. For the OECD-20 sample, 
the effect is 12 per cent on exports from the eurozone to outsiders and 13 per cent on 
exports to the eurozone from outsiders. For the EU-13 sample, only one estimate is 
significant. The significant effect is for exports from outsiders to the eurozone and is 9 
per cent.  
The results give rise to two questions. First, customs union theory predicts that the 
elimination of tariffs or other trade barriers between custom union members leads to 
increased trade between members – trade creation – at the expense of  decreased trade 
between members and non-members – trade diversion. The reason is that imports from 
outside countries are replaced by imports from custom union member countries, since 
imports from the latter have become relatively cheaper by the elimination of trade 
barriers within the customs union. Our estimates say that the currency union has led to 
trade creation all around, between members as well as between members and non-
members. Second, the formation of the currency union has surprisingly large effects, 
considering that the resource costs of currency exchange and hedging against changes in 
nominal exchange rates are small, probably not greater than a fraction of one per cent 
(Calmfors et al, 1997), and considering that the empirical research finds that nominal 
exchange rate uncertainty has small or no effects on trade. 
The unexpected increase in exports from non-members to members could be 
explained by the existence of fixed costs in exporting. Assume that exporting requires 
local sales, marketing and distribution facilities. Assume further that the low trade costs 
between countries forming the Single Market in combination with economies of scale 
make it profitable for outside exporters to have such facilities in just one country inside 
the Single Market and to incur the costs of shipping products to other countries within the 
Single Market through that country. Given these assumptions, outside exporters may 
benefit from the common currency to almost the same extent as exporters inside the 
Single Market. In addition, the reduction in trade costs caused by the common currency 
may make it profitable to incur the fixed costs of exporting and lead to new exports to 
currency union members from outside countries.  The increase in exports from members of the currency union to non-members 
could be explained by lower cost of inputs for exporters. The common currency has 
lowered the cost of purchasing inputs from other countries belonging to the currency 
union and thereby made producers in the currency union more competitive. Yi (2003) 
shows that if the production process involves several stages located in different countries 
and the shipping of intermediate inputs across national borders, small trade costs can add 
up to a considerable share of the final cost.   
The surprisingly large currency union effects indicate that reduction of nominal 
exchange rate volatility on one hand and completely eliminating it by forming a currency 
union on the other are qualitatively different phenomena. It could be that the effect of 
reducing nominal exchange rate uncertainty is highly non-linear; the difference in 
uncertainty between even very small exchange rate volatility under a regime of flexible 
exchange rates and no nominal exchange rate volatility under a common currency is 
probably great in the minds of economic decision makers.  
Most of the empirical research on the trade effects of exchange rate uncertainty 
has dealt with changes at relatively high frequencies, month-to-month, quarter-to-quarter 
or year-to-year. Exchange rate uncertainty within a year can easily be hedged against at 
low cost, but longer term uncertainty is much more costly or impossible to hedge against. 
If exporting decisions involve fixed costs and have time horizons of several years, 
exchange rate uncertainty could have much greater effects than generally found in the 
empirical research. Relatively few studies have estimated the effects of exchange rate 
changes at low frequencies, but they tend to find significant negative trade effects 
(McKenzie, 1999). 
  It should be noted that almost all of the GDP and real exchange rate variables in 
Table 4 have expected signs and that most are highly significant. The elasticity of exports 
with respect to the importing country’s GDP is about 1.2, which is consistent with the 
trend increase in the ratio of trade to GDP. The deviation from trend GDP in the 
importing country has the expected positive sign and is significant (not shown), 
indicating that imports depend positively on domestic capacity in a cyclical fashion. The 
exporting country’s deviation from trend GDP has no significant effect however. Real 
exchange rates mostly have expected signs and are significant. The exception is the contemporaneous effect of competitors’ real exchange rates in the destination country, 
which is estimated to be negative instead of positive.  
 
6. Robustness checks  
Table A3 shows how robust the currency union estimates are to dropping controls for 
GDP and real exchange rates. Estimates tend to increase as controls are dropped, but 
remain highly significant. Note that contemporaneous real exchange rates pick up 
significant effects in dropped lagged real exchange rates and that R
2 is unaffected by 
dropping lagged real exchange rates. 
  Tables A4 and A5 report how robust estimates are to dropping individual 
countries in the OECD-20 and EU-13 country samples respectively. The estimates are 
remarkably constant in size and significance in the case of most countries, with two 
notable exceptions. Dropping Denmark raises all currency union effects substantially, 
which indicates that the introduction of the euro caused Denmark to increase its trade 
with countries outside the currency union and decrease its trade with currency union 
countries in relative terms. Dropping the United Kingdom lowers the currency union 
effects, which indicates that the euro caused the United Kingdom to increase its trade 
with currency union members and decrease its trade with other outside countries .  
  It must be kept in mind that Denmark and United Kingdom together with Sweden 
make up the benchmark in the EU-13 estimates. Dropping one of them reduces the 
benchmark number of export flows from six to only two and make the estimates much 
more dependent on any idiosyncratic effects in the remaining benchmark trade flows. For 
this reason, we have more confidence in the estimates with the larger benchmark of 10 
OECD countries. 
 
7. Currency union effects on the intensive and extensive margins of trade 
The estimated currency union effects can in principle be due to increases on the intensive 
or extensive margins of trade or both. An increase on the intensive margin of trade refers 
to increased exports of products already being exported and an increase on the extensive 
margin refers to exports of products that have not been exported before. Lower trade 
costs make foreign goods more competitive relative to domestic goods and should therefore lead to increases in existing trade but also to new trade to the extent that it 
becomes profitable and can cover start-up and fixed costs of exporting.  
In order to differentiate between the internal and external margins of trade we 
make use of highly disaggregated trade data, the six-digit level of the Harmonized 
System (HS). This means that the dataset becomes very large. We have 380 bilateral one-
way trade relations, the sample period consists of 11 years and the number of statistical 
product categories at the six-digit level is about 5 015, which yields a dataset of nearly 21 
million observations, including zeros.  
The number of statistical HS-6 categories that are exported over time can give us 
a first indication of euro effects on the extensive margin of trade. We have calculated the 
number of exported six-digit level statistical product categories during the sample period 
for each bilateral one-way trade relation. Panels (a) and (b) of figure 3 show indexed time 
series for the number of product categories in trade within, from and to the eurozone 
relative to the 10 outside OECD countries and 3 outside EU countries respectively. A 
strong business cycle element is apparent in the raw data for the number of products 
exported within and from the eurozone – the number peaks at the height of the business 
cycle in the year 2000 and then drops – but there is also a rising trend. The business cycle 
element is probably due to the fact imports are needed to satisfy demand when capacity 
utilization is high at the peak of the business cycle.  
 
 Figure 3  Number of exported HS-6 product categories 
 








1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 








1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Within eurozone From To
 
 
We have estimated euro effects on the number of exported product categories, 
employing the same specification of the gravity equation. The results are reported in 
Table 3. 
 
 Table 3   Currency union effects on the number of exported HS-6 product categories 
        
        
  20 OECD countries  13 EU countries 
        
EZ11p1 0.031***  (3.1%)  -0.003  (-0.3%) 
 [0.009]    [0.009]   
EZ11p2 0.056***  (5.8%)  0.006  (0.6%) 
 [0.011]    [0.012]   
EZ10p1 0.031***  (3.1%)  -0.001  (-0.1%) 
 [0.008]    [0.010]   
EZ10p2 0.040***  (4.1%)  -0.013  (-1.3%) 
 [0.009]    [0.012]   
EZ01p1 0.014  (1.4%)  -0.007  (-0.7%) 
 [0.011]    [0.010]   
EZ01p2 0.038***  (3.9%)  0.004  (0.4%) 
 [0.013]    [0.013]   
lnRGDPx 0.237***    0.162***   
 [0.035]    [0.029]   
lnRGDPm 0.412***    0.405***   
 [0.038]    [0.038]   
lnREXRxm -0.764***    -0.826***  
 [0.028]    [0.036]   
lnREXRcm 0.661***    0.847***   
 [0.042]    [0.055]   
lnREXRxm-1 -0.120***    -0.211***  
 [0.026]    [0.032]   
lnREXRcm-1 0.120***    0.158***   
 [0.039]    [0.050]   
        
Observations 4161    1704   
Panels 380    156   
R-squared 0.74    0.91   
        
OLS, robust standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
       
Country pair fixed effects     




Significant euro effects are found only for the OECD-20 country sample. The 
euro is estimated to have increased the number of exported HS-6 products within the 
eurozone by about 6 per cent and exports to and from the eurozone by about 4 per cent.   
The number of exported HS-6 product categories is of course only an 
approximation of the extensive margin of trade. It is the net of new and discontinued exports and each category holds products that sometimes are very imperfect substitutes. 
Also, we cannot gauge the quantitative importance of external relative to internal margin 
effects based on our estimates for total exports and for the number of exported products, 
since the estimates are based on different units of account. It is probably the case that the 
value per product category of new exports is considerably smaller on average than that of 
existing exports. It is therefore not sufficient to count the number of exported products on 
the respective margin to assess the importance of effects on the intensive relative to the 
extensive margin. 
Instead, we use a different approach. We define the intensive margin to consist of 
HS-6 categories that are exported in each and every year in a given bilateral one-way 
trade relation. There are approximately 1.9 million such relations. The difference between 
total exports and these “core” exports are defined as exports on the extensive margin of 
trade. The extensive margin consists of statistical product categories where no exports 
were registered in at least one of the years in our eleven year sample period. Some 
statistical product categories cease to be exported after a certain year, some are exported 
intermittently during the sample period, and some are exported every year starting in 
some year after 1995. Only the latter correspond to the theoretical concept of external 
margin. The value of extensive margin exports defined this way as a share of total exports 
amount to 10.6 per cent of exports within the eurozone, 15.5 per cent of export from the 
eurozone, 17.7 per cent of exports to the eurozone and 17.4 per cent of exports between 
outside countries on average for the pre-currency union years, 1995-1998. Ideally, the 
share should be zero in the starting year.  
Figure 4 presents raw data on total exports and on intensive and extensive margin 
exports as defined above. The series are indexed and expressed relative to the benchmark 
of 10 OECD countries. As can be seen, intensive margin exports exhibit the same time 
pattern as total exports, with a marked increase in intensive margin exports within the 
eurozone and from the eurozone to outside countries during the euro period. The upward 
trends are stronger for extensive than intensive margin exports and pertain to all 
categories of exports relative to exports between outside countries.  
 Figure 4  Total, intensive and extensive margin exports relative to OECD-10 
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 The estimates reported in Table 4 confirm the impression from the raw data that 
euro effects on the extensive margin are greater (in percentage terms) than on the 
intensive margin of trade. 
  
Table 4   Currency union effects on the intensive and extensive margins of trade     
                
                
  20 OECD countries      13 EU countries     
                
  Total  Intensive Extensive   Total  Intensive  Extensive   
   margin  margin      margin  Margin   
                
EZ11p1 0.165***  0.149***  0.210***    0.114***  0.128***  0.061   
 [0.023]  [0.021]  [0.059]    [0.032] [0.034] [0.083]   
EZ11p2 0.232***  0.201***  0.324***    0.187***  0.184***  0.215**   
 [0.024]  [0.022]  [0.057]    [0.037] [0.038] [0.090]   
EZ10p1 0.074***  0.044**  0.146***    0.032  0.028  0.055   
 [0.020]  [0.018]  [0.050]    [0.033] [0.034] [0.088]   
EZ10p2 0.113***  0.072***  0.274***    0.052  0.031  0.228**   
 [0.022]  [0.020]  [0.050]    [0.039] [0.040] [0.097]   
EZ01p1 0.085***  0.078***  0.129**    0.053  0.070**  -0.028   
 [0.025]  [0.021]  [0.057]    [0.033] [0.035] [0.082]   
EZ01p2 0.120***  0.090***  0.283***    0.086**  0.087**  0.117   
 [0.026]  [0.024]  [0.054]    [0.040] [0.043] [0.090]   
lnRGDPx 0.590***  0.623***  0.330**    0.603***  0.658***  0.027   
 [0.089]  [0.090]  [0.152]    [0.117] [0.122] [0.181]   
lnRGDPm 1.185***  1.054***  1.548***    1.198***  0.972***  1.689***   
 [0.078]  [0.084]  [0.150]    [0.104] [0.114] [0.196]   
lnREXRxm -0.189***  -0.164**  -0.131   0.320***  -0.287**  -0.949***   
 [0.066]  [0.068]  [0.149]    [0.113] [0.116] [0.253]   
lnREXRcm -0.297***  -0.244***  -0.357*    -0.161  -0.317**  0.850**   
 [0.094]  [0.091]  [0.212]    [0.153] [0.157] [0.399]   
lnREXRxm-1 -0.605***  -0.673***  -0.772***   0.595***  -0.578***  -0.398*   
 [0.067]  [0.068]  [0.155]    [0.108] [0.112] [0.241]   
lnREXRcm-1 0.392*** 0.403*** 0.637***   0.464***  0.419** 0.375   
 [0.091]  [0.091]  [0.221]    [0.157] [0.164] [0.398]   
                
Observations 4161  4161  4161    1704  1704  1704   
Panels 380  380  380    156  156  156   
R-squared 0.53  0.52  0.20    0.65 0.62 0.31   
                
OLS, robust standard errors in brackets 
Controls for deviations from GDP trend, Single Market participation and common year effects 
Country pair fixed effects, controls for deviations from GDP trend, Single Market participation and 
common year effects 
 
  
  Practically all euro effects on the intensive and extensive margins of trade for the 
larger sample of 20 OECD countries are highly significant, but the extensive margin 
effects are estimated to be up to three times larger than the intensive margin effects. This 
is not surprising, considering that the extensive margin contains both products that are 
exported intermittently during the sample period – a “soft” core – and a net increase in 
the number of products. Solving for the weights that make the intensive and extensive 
margin estimates add up to the estimates for total trade, we find that the weight is 0.25 for 
extensive margin exports within the eurozone, 0.20 for exports from the eurozone and 
0.15 for exports to the eurozone.  
  As for the sample of 13 EU countries, only the estimates for exports within the 
eurozone are significant. Here the weight on the estimate for extensive margin exports is 
smaller, 0.07. 
  
8. Currency union effects at different stages of processing  
The estimated currency union effects are surprisingly large, considering the relatively 
small resource costs of currency exchange and hedging. We have speculated that 
switching from flexible nominal exchange rates to fixed rates under a common currency 
should have much larger effects than reducing nominal exchange rate volatility without a 
regime change. We have also speculated that the existence of fixed costs in combination 
with the reduction in trade costs serve to increase trade between currency union members 
and outside countries.  
We may obtain a better understanding of the currency union effects by estimating 
effects on a disaggregated level, for different stages of processing and different product 
groups. If our explanations in terms of uncertainty and fixed costs are valid, we should 
expect effects to be concentrated on highly processed products, which require relatively 
high fixed costs in the form of distribution and marketing and which typically consist of a 
great number of inputs that are sourced from several countries, where the same 
component can cross national borders more than once in the process of production and 
assembly. Figure 5 A and B report the indexed time series for raw material, semi-finished 
and finished exports, respectively, relative to the two benchmarks. The different stages of 
processing are defined according to the World Trade Organization’s MTN (Multilateral 
Trade Negotiation) classification. The raw data give the impression that euro effects are 












 Figure 5 A  Exports of raw materials, semi-finished and finished products relative to the 
benchmark of 10 OECD countries 
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 Figure 5 B  Exports of raw materials, semi-finished and finished products relative to the 
benchmark of 3 EU countries 
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 We employ the gravity equation to estimate euro effects for exports of raw 
materials, semi-finished and finished products. The specification of the gravity equation 
is altered by replacing GDP of the exporter as a measure of supply capacity by total 
exports of the respective products. The dependent variable is a component of the 
independent variable and can be correlated with it, which may give simultaneity bias (but 
this is also the case for the specification with GDP, since trade is a component of GDP).
  Data on exports of product groups in current prices have been deflated by the 
exporter’s producer price index. The appropriate procedure would have been to use a 
price index for each product group and stage of processing. Such price indices are 
however not available.
6 
  Table 6 shows euro estimates for the three products groups relative to the OECD-
















                                                 
6 Both value and physical quantity are reported at the HS six-digit level. The quantity data are however 
often missing and of poor quality. Our attempt to construct industry price indices produced implausible 
results and had to be abandoned.  
Table 6  Currency union effects on exports of raw materials, semi-finished and finished 
              products 
                                
(a) 20 OECD countries     
      
      
 Total  Raw  Inter-  Finished 
    materials mediates products 
      
EZ11p1 0.165***  0.061  0.212***  0.190*** 
  [0.023] [0.054] [0.040] [0.028] 
EZ11p2 0.232***  0.001  0.246***  0.313*** 
  [0.024] [0.054] [0.039] [0.027] 
EZ10p1 0.074***  0.083  0.099***  0.083*** 
  [0.020] [0.062] [0.033] [0.024] 
EZ10p2 0.113***  0.049  0.101***  0.155*** 
  [0.022] [0.061] [0.032] [0.025] 
EZ01p1 0.085***  -0.036  0.129***  0.092*** 
  [0.025] [0.054] [0.050] [0.030] 
EZ01p2 0.120***  -0.084*  0.189***  0.151*** 
  [0.026] [0.049] [0.048] [0.030] 
lnRGDPx 0.590***  0.075  1.101***  0.609*** 
  [0.089] [0.163] [0.180] [0.091] 
lnRGDPm 1.185***  0.920***  0.993***  1.008*** 
  [0.078] [0.190] [0.151] [0.083] 
lnREXRxm -0.189***  -0.618***  -0.298*  -0.092 
  [0.066] [0.141] [0.156] [0.072] 
lnREXRcm  -0.297***  0.359 0.274 -0.453*** 
  [0.094] [0.273] [0.196] [0.102] 
lnREXRxm-1  -0.605*** -0.659*** -0.470*** -0.601*** 
  [0.067] [0.159] [0.151] [0.073] 
lnREXRcm-1 0.392***  0.481**  0.096 0.394*** 
  [0.091] [0.242] [0.195] [0.102] 
      
Observations  4161 4161 4161 4161 
Panels  380 380 380 380 
R-squared  0.53 0.08 0.20 0.51 
      
Robust standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
      





 Table 6  continued    
               
 
(b) 13 EU countries     
      
      
 Total  Raw  Inter-  Finished 
    materials mediates products 
      
EZ11p1 0.114***  -0.040  0.177***  0.119*** 
  [0.032] [0.067] [0.048] [0.036] 
EZ11p2 0.187***  -0.064  0.201***  0.217*** 
  [0.037] [0.050] [0.041] [0.044] 
EZ10p1 0.032  0.091  0.094**  0.024 
  [0.033] [0.076] [0.047] [0.037] 
EZ10p2  0.052 0.078 0.045 0.063 
  [0.039] [0.058] [0.043] [0.046] 
EZ01p1 0.053  -0.299***  0.106*  0.061* 
  [0.033] [0.084] [0.056] [0.037] 
EZ01p2 0.086**  -0.190***  0.171***  0.081* 
  [0.040] [0.054] [0.049] [0.047] 
lnRGDP_i 0.603***  0.229  1.458***  0.501*** 
  [0.117] [0.165] [0.212] [0.139] 
lnRGDP_j 1.198***  1.018***  1.104***  1.176*** 
  [0.104] [0.215] [0.224] [0.101] 
lnREXRij -0.320***  -0.816***  -0.032  -0.439*** 
  [0.113] [0.220] [0.175] [0.134] 
lnREXRkj -0.161  0.572*  -0.162  -0.163 
  [0.153] [0.331] [0.243] [0.177] 
lnREXRij1 -0.595***  -0.441**  -0.576***  -0.597*** 
  [0.108] [0.219] [0.167] [0.126] 
lnREXRkj1 0.464***  0.734**  0.631***  0.453** 
  [0.157] [0.337] [0.230] [0.184] 
      
Observations  1704 1704 1704 1704 
Panels  156 156 156 156 
R-squared 0.65  0.18  0.43  0.62 
      
Robust standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
      






   The currency union estimates for semi-finished and finished products in the 
OECD-20 country sample have expected positive signs, are of similar magnitude and 
highly significant, whereas the estimates for raw materials are insignificant (with one 
exception) and the equation for raw materials has low explanatory power. The estimates 
in the case of the EU-13 sample show a similar pattern, although fewer estimates are 
significant.  It is clear that the inclusion of raw materials reduces the overall estimates 
and that the large and positive currency union effects for aggregate exports should be 
attributed to effects on trade in semi-finished and finished products.  
 
9. Currency union effects at the industry level 
We do not think that the estimated currency union effects for raw materials exports can 
be taken at face value. This becomes more evident when looking at estimates of currency 
union effects at the industry level.  
  Table A6 reports currency union estimates for individual industries at the ISIC 
two-digit level.
7 The industry trade data was compiled from HS six-digit level trade data 
using concordance tables available in the WITS portal. 
Practically no effects are found in agriculture and related activities (01-05), 
mining and quarrying (10-14), and low-tech or raw materials based industries, such as 
food products (15-16), textiles and footwear (17-19), pulp and paper (21) or petroleum 
products (23). Significant, positive and large currency union effects are found exclusively 
(with one or two exceptions) in chemical, metal product and engineering industries (24-
36). Among the industries that stand out in terms of significant and large positive effects 
are pharmaceuticals (2423), rubber and plastic products (25), metals and fabricated metal 
products (27-28), machinery and equipment (29-33) and transport equipment (34-35).  
These are categories where the raw material component of the price generally is low 
because of the amount of processing involved, and where the aggregate producer price 
index should correspond approximately to the relevant product group price index.  
                                                 
7  The estimates reported in Table A6 were produced with a modified gravity equation. The respective 
industry’s total exports was used as a measure of supply capacity, instead of deviation from trend GDP, and 
the trade shares used to compute competitors’ real exchange rates are for competitors’ exports in the same 
industry. 
   The conclusion that can be drawn from the industry estimates is that the currency 
union effects on aggregate trade can be attributed to trade in highly processed product 
groups that have relatively large shares of output and trade. The effects for raw materials 
and low-tech products are unclear. The high frequency of implausible point estimates for 
agriculture and other raw materials based industries where prices are known to vary, such 
as for petroleum products, indicate that these estimates are much influenced by remaining 
price effects in the data after deflating with producer price indices. 
 
Conclusion and summary 
We conclude that our estimates do show that the formation of the European currency 
union in 1999 has affected international trade; the fact that annual estimates become 
significant in 1999 or 2000 and that the estimates for 1999-2005 are significantly higher 
than the estimates for 1995-1998 (particularly in the sample of 20 OECD countries) 
provide strong support for the presence of such effects. 
We estimate that the currency union has increased the level of exports in 2002-
2005 relative to 1995-1998 between currency union members by 26 per cent relative to 
ten outside OECD countries and by 21 per cent relative to three outside EU countries. 
Exports from member to outside countries has been increased by 12 per cent compared to 
exports between the ten outside OECD countries, and exports from outside to member 
countries has been increased by 13 per cent compared to the ten outside OECD countries 
and by 9 per cent compared to the three outside EU countries. 
The currency union effects on trade are surprisingly large considering the small 
costs of currency exchange and hedging and considering the consensus of the extensive 
empirical literature on nominal exchange rate uncertainty that such uncertainty has very 
small or no effects on trade. We argue that these findings are irrelevant; the switch from 
flexible nominal exchange rates to fixed nominal exchange rates provided by a common 
currency is likely to reduce uncertainty to a much larger extent than a reduction in the 
volatility of nominal exchange rates under a regime of flexible exchange rates, and 
should therefore have much larger effects of trade. Furthermore, the literature has dealt 
with high frequency exchange rate changes, not longer term changes, which are much 
harder to hedge against.   That the currency union has served to increase trade between member and outside 
countries is contrary to the prediction of customs union theory. The elimination of costs 
of currency exchange and hedging inside the currency union should have induced 
importers to switch from outside to more competitive inside suppliers. The increase in 
exports from outside countries to member countries could be explained by the existence 
of fixed costs of exporting, which have led outside exporters to set up distribution, sales 
and marketing facilities in one of the currency union countries. When trade costs were 
lowered inside the currency union, such outsiders gained almost as much as exporters 
inside the currency union. Also, the lower trade costs could have been sufficient to cover 
fixed costs of exporting on the margin and could thereby have induced new exports from 
outside exporters. The increase in exports from member to outside countries could be 
explained by lower costs of purchasing inputs from other countries inside the customs 
union, which have made exporters in member countries more competitive. 
  We find significant increases in the number of exported statistical product 
categories at the HS six-digit level. We take this as an indication of currency union 
effects on the extensive margin of trade. The number of exported product categories in 
2002-2005 relative to 1995-1998 is increased by about 6 per cent  between currency 
union member countries and by about 4 per cent between member and outside countries 
compared the ten outside OECD countries. No significant external margin effects were 
found in the EU country sample. 
  In order to assess the relative importance of intensive and external margin effects 
on trade, we make use of the six-digit level HS product categories and define the 
intensive margin as consisting of product categories for which positive exports are 
registered each and every year during the sample period in the 1.9 million panels in our 
dataset. The difference between total exports and these “core” exports is defined as the 
extensive margin of trade. The extensive margin consists of all product categories for 
which zero exports were registered in at least one year during the sample period. Some of 
these product categories ceased to be exported, some were exported intermittently and 
some started to be exported after 1995 and were exported every subsequent year during 
the sample period. The latter correspond most closely to the theoretical concept of the 
external margin. The products belonging to our definition of the external margin make up 11-18 per cent of the total in the pre-currency years, 1995-1998, depending on the 
category of trade relation (within, to, from or outside eurozone). We find that both 
intensive and extensive margin currency union effects are highly significant and that the 
external margin effects are significantly larger than the intensive margin effects. About 
25 per cent of the total effect for exports within the eurozone can be attributed to 
extensive margin effects. The corresponding shares for exports from and to the eurozone 
are 20 and 15  per cent respectively.   
  When we estimate currency union effects at different stages of processing and for 
different industries, we find significant, positive and large effects for semi-finished and 
finished products and for industries with highly processed products for which raw 
material prices play a relatively small role for the price of the finished product. Estimates 
for exports of agricultural products and products where raw material prices play a 
relatively large role are largely insignificant, erratic or implausible. A case in point is oil 
and oil products. It is likely that the estimates for oil and other raw material exports 
reflect price changes that remain after deflating with producer price indices. 
     









  References 
  
Anderson, James (1979), “The theoretical foundations for the gravity equation”, 
American Economic Review 69, 106-116. 
 
Baldwin, Richard and Daria Taglioni (2004), “Positive OCA criteria: Microfoundations 
for the Rose effect”, unpublished manuscript, 
http://hei.unige.ch/%7Ebaldwin/PapersBooks/OCA_BaldwinTaglioni17Mar04.pdf 
 




Baldwin, Richard and Virginia Di Nino (2006), “Euros and zeros: The common currency 
effect on trade in new goods,” 
http://hei.unige.ch/~baldwin/PapersBooks/BaldwinDiNino_31Oct06_Submitted.pdf 
 
Berger, Helge and Volker Nitsch (2205), “Zooming out: The trade effect of the euro in 
historical perspective”, CESifo Working Paper No. 1435. 
 
Calmfors, Lars et al (1997), EMU – A Swedish perspective (Boston, Dordrecht, London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers). 
 
Deardorff, Alan (1998), “Determinants of bilateral trade: Does gravity work in a 
neoclassical world?”, in Jeffrey Frankel (ed.), The regionalization of the world economy 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).  
 
Flam, Harry and Håkan Nordström (2003), “Trade volume effects of the euro: Aggregate 
and sector estimates”, unpublished manuscript, 
http://www.iies.su.se/publications/seminarpapers/746.pdf 
 Helpman, Elhanan and Paul Krugman (1985), Market structure and foreign trade 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press). 
 
IMF (2004), “Exchange rate volatility – some new evidence”, 
www.imf.org/external/np/res/exrate/2004/eng/051904.pdf 
 
McKenzie, Michael D. (1999), “The impact of exchange rate volatility on international 
trade flows”, Journal of economic surveys 13, 71-106. 
 
Melitz, Marc (2003), “The impact of trade on intraindustry reallocations and aggregate 
industry productivity”, Econometrica 71, 1695-1725. 
 
Roberts, Mark J. and James R. Tybout (1997), “The decision to export in Colombia: An 
empirical model of entry with sunk costs”, American Economic Review 87, 545-564. 
 
Rose, Andrew K. (2000), “One money, one market: Estimating the effect of common 
currencies on trade”, Economic Policy 30, 9-45. 
 
Rose, Andrew K. (2001), “Currency unions and trade: The effect is large”, Economic 
Policy 33, 449-461. 
 
Yi, Kei-Mu (2003), “Can vertical specialization explain the growth of world trade?”, 
Journal of Political Economy 111, 52-102. 
  
 Table A1   Annual currency union effects              
                
  Within eurozone    From eurozone      To eurozone 
 OECD-20  EU-13    OECD-20  EU-13      OECD-20  EU-13 
                
EZ11t96 0.026  -0.022  EZ10t96  0.014  -0.020   EZ01t96  -0.022  -0.044 
 [0.048]  [0.083]    [0.044]  [0.088]      [0.051]  [0.089] 
EZ11t97 0.083  -0.011  EZ10t97  0.050  0.004    EZ01t97  -0.004  -0.070 
 [0.050]  [0.077]    [0.049]  [0.081]      [0.049]  [0.080] 
EZ11t98 0.073  0.015  EZ10t98  0.036  -0.033   EZ01t98  0.018  -0.003 
 [0.046]  [0.071]    [0.043]  [0.075]      [0.049]  [0.076] 
EZ11t99 0.182***  0.132*  EZ10t99  0.095**  0.051    EZ01t99  0.059  0.059 
 [0.043]  [0.068]    [0.040]  [0.071]      [0.043]  [0.071] 
EZ11t00 0.230***  0.124  EZ10t00  0.105***  0.016    EZ01t00  0.089*  0.020 
 [0.045]  [0.075]    [0.040]  [0.078]      [0.048]  [0.078] 
EZ11t01 0.225***  0.077  EZ10t01  0.099**  -0.009   EZ01t01  0.106**  -0.001 
 [0.043]  [0.068]    [0.040]  [0.072]      [0.045]  [0.071] 
EZ11t02 0.240***  0.114  EZ10t02  0.109**  0.010    EZ01t02  0.104**  0.009 
 [0.047]  [0.087]    [0.043]  [0.091]      [0.049]  [0.091] 
EZ11t03 0.265***  0.206***  EZ10t03  0.106***  0.049    EZ01t03  0.113**  0.080 
 [0.044]  [0.080]    [0.041]  [0.084]      [0.044]  [0.083] 
EZ11t04 0.312***  0.214***  EZ10t04  0.152***  0.047    EZ01t04  0.147*** 0.079 
 [0.050]  [0.082]    [0.049]  [0.088]      [0.051]  [0.089] 
EZ11t05 0.297***  0.202***  EZ10t05  0.187***  0.049    EZ01t05  0.112**  0.073 
 [0.051]  [0.075]    [0.047]  [0.081]      [0.056]  [0.088] 
                
Observations 4161 1704              
Panels 380  156               
R-squared 0.53  0.65              
                
OLS, robust standard errors in brackets               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
Country pair fixed effects, controls for GDP, deviations from trend GDP, real exchange rates, Single Market participation, common year 
effects.  Table A2   Tests of differences between annual coefficients          
                  
(a) 20 OECD countries                 
                  
     Within  eurozone          
                  
 1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005
                  
1996                     
1997 1.32                    
1998 1.21  0.02                  
1999 17.02***  7.12***  10.48***                
2000  22.37*** 11.24*** 15.81*** 0.99              
2001  23.92*** 11.37*** 16.69*** 0.98  0.00            
2002 15.17***  6.31** 8.83***  0.01 1.11  1.15          
2003  32.60*** 17.35*** 23.99*** 4.13**  0.99  1.27  4.46**        
2004  36.54*** 21.67*** 26.84*** 7.52*** 3.35* 3.82*  7.70**  1.02      
2005  30.29*** 17.46*** 21.32*** 5.00**  1.96  2.23  5.21**  0.38  0.10    
                  
                  
     From  eurozone           
                  
 1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005
                  
1996                     
1997 0.62                    
1998 0.37  0.07                  
1999 8.11***  2.74*  5.66**               
2000 6.27** 1.89  4.11** 0.12             
2001 5.67  1.57  3.53*  0.22 0.02            
2002  2.66 0.37 1.14 1.80  0.92  0.69          
2003 6.44** 1.97  4.15** 0.05 0.01  0.06  1.09        
2004 9.34** 4.34** 6.98***  0.82 1.31  1.55  3.47* 1.09      
2005 15.25***  7.93***  12.08***  3.11*  3.96**  4.36**  7.28***  3.52* 0.48   
                  
                  
     To  eurozone           
                  
 1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005
                  
1996                     
1997 0.12                    
1998 0.61  0.20                  
1999 3.88** 2.76*  1.41                
2000 4.97** 3.86** 2.35  0.28             
2001 7.16***  5.75** 3.98** 1.01 0.16            
2002  3.52*  2.45 1.24 0.00  0.22  0.84          
2003 8.47** 6.90***  4.88** 1.55 0.35  0.04  1.29        
2004 10.36***  8.80***  6.67***  3.15*  1.39  0.76  2.77* 0.50      
2005 5.35** 4.25** 2.89*  0.77 0.18  0.01  0.69  0.00  0.37   (b) 13 EU countries                 
             
        Within eurozone            
             
 1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005
             
1996               
1997 0.02             
1998 0.31  0.21             
1999 5.95** 7.59***  7.78***            
2000 4.27** 4.99** 4.38**  0.03             
2001 2.46  2.78*  2.27  2.34 0.97            
2002  2.65  2.73* 2.01 0.08 0.02 0.30         
2003 8.99***  10.22***  9.98***  1.74 1.67  5.42**  1.41        
2004 9.23***  10.46***  9.73***  1.87 1.79  5.16**  1.54  0.01      
2005  10.03***  11.68***  11.21*** 1.84 1.70 5.80**  1.40 0.00 0.03   
             
      From  eurozone       
             
 1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005
             
1996               
1997 0.10             
1998 0.04  0.40             
1999 1.20  0.77  3.87**            
2000 0.25  0.03  0.86  0.59             
2001 0.03  0.06  0.28  2.70 0.28            
2002  0.12  0.01  0.37 0.37 0.01 0.08         
2003  0.77  0.41  1.77 0.00 0.27 1.03 0.23       
2004  0.65  0.33  1.41 0.00 0.20 0.78 0.19 0.00     
2005  0.84  0.45  1.94 0.00 0.30 1.13 0.25 0.00 0.00   
             
      To  eurozone       
             
 1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005
             
1996               
1997 0.12             
1998 0.32  1.20             
1999 2.33  5.60** 1.64            
2000 0.75  2.09  0.17  0.59             
2001 0.40  1.56  0.00  2.28 0.18            
2002  0.36  1.00  0.02 0.53 0.02 0.02         
2003 2.37  4.52** 1.61  0.13 0.80  1.89  0.76        
2004  1.99  3.69* 1.24 0.09 0.61 1.38 0.63 0.00     
2005  1.88  3.65* 1.18 0.05 0.54 1.35 0.56 0.01 0.00   
             
             
F-values of Wald test                 
* significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 %, significant at 1 %         Table A3   Robustness check: Specification       
            
            
(a) 20 OECD countries           
            
EZ11p1  0.165*** 0.179*** 0.164*** 0.191*** 0.237***  
  [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024]  
EZ11p2  0.232*** 0.250*** 0.234*** 0.238*** 0.287***  
  [0.024] [0.023] [0.024] [0.025] [0.026]  
EZ10p1  0.074*** 0.094*** 0.074*** 0.136*** 0.148***  
  [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.023]  
EZ10p2  0.113*** 0.139*** 0.112*** 0.162*** 0.175***  
  [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.024]  
EZ01p1  0.085*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.048*  0.082***  
  [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026]  
EZ01p2  0.120*** 0.111*** 0.124*** 0.077*** 0.113***  
  [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027]  
lnRGDPx  0.590*** 0.546*** 0.592*** 0.439***    
  [0.089] [0.089] [0.089] [0.092]    
lnRGDPm  1.185*** 1.198*** 1.179*** 1.211***    
  [0.078] [0.078] [0.079] [0.082]    
GAPx 0.004  0.007**  0.004       
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]      
GAPm  0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014***      
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]      
lnREXRxm -0.189***  -0.597***         
 [0.066]  [0.049]         
lnREXRcm -0.297***  -0.034         
 [0.094]  [0.070]         
lnREXRxm-1 -0.605***    -0.749***       
 [0.067]    [0.050]       
lnREXRcm-1 0.392***    0.168**       
 [0.091]    [0.069]       
            
Observations 4161 4161 4161 4161 4161  
Panels  380 380 380 380 380  
R-squared  0.53 0.51 0.52 0.47 0.41  
            
OLS, robust standard errors in brackets       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
            








 (b)  13  EU  countries      
        
EZ11p1  0.114*** 0.136*** 0.116*** 0.144*** 0.158*** 0.200*** 
 [0.032]  [0.032]  [0.033]  [0.035] [0.034] [0.033] 
EZ11p2  0.187*** 0.209*** 0.191*** 0.212*** 0.158*** 0.201*** 
 [0.037]  [0.037]  [0.038]  [0.041] [0.038] [0.038] 
EZ10p1 0.032  0.059*  0.027  0.092**  0.101***  0.115*** 
 [0.033]  [0.033]  [0.034]  [0.037] [0.036] [0.036] 
EZ10p2  0.052 0.080**  0.044 0.092**  0.062 0.078* 
 [0.039]  [0.039]  [0.040]  [0.043] [0.042] [0.040] 
EZ01p1  0.053 0.047 0.060*  0.022 0.028 0.055 
 [0.033]  [0.034]  [0.035]  [0.038] [0.036] [0.037] 
EZ01p2  0.086**  0.081**  0.099**  0.072 0.048 0.076* 
 [0.040]  [0.040]  [0.042]  [0.044] [0.043] [0.043] 
lnRGDPx  0.603*** 0.581*** 0.636*** 0.715*** 0.520***  
 [0.117]  [0.118]  [0.118] [0.121] [0.121]  
lnRGDPm  1.198*** 1.202*** 1.147*** 1.093*** 0.953***  
 [0.104]  [0.106]  [0.104] [0.111] [0.111]  
GAPx  0.023*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.033***    
 [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006]    
GAPm  0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.025***    
 [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006]    
lnREXRxm  -0.320***  -0.743***      
  [0.113]  [0.086]      
lnREXRcm  -0.161  0.168      
  [0.153]  [0.111]      
lnREXRxm-1  -0.595***   -0.843***     
  [0.108]   [0.085]     
lnREXRcm-1  0.464***   0.341***     
  [0.157]   [0.115]     
        
Observations  1704 1704 1704 1704 1704 1704 
Panels  156 156 156 156 156 156 
R-squared 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.54 
        
OLS, robust standard errors in brackets         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
        
Country pair fixed effects, controls for Single Market participation and common year effects 
        Table A4   Robustness check: Exclusion of individual countries (sample of 20 OECD countries)       
              
 Total  Austria  Belgium  Finland  France  Germany Ireland  Italy  Holland  Portugal  Spain 
              
EZ11p1  0.165*** 0.154*** 0.160*** 0.165***  0.163*** 0.168*** 0.146*** 0.166*** 0.189*** 0.208*** 0.155*** 
  [0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]  [0.024] [0.025] [0.022] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] 
EZ11p2  0.232*** 0.221*** 0.200*** 0.248***  0.238*** 0.234*** 0.218*** 0.234*** 0.241*** 0.267*** 0.216*** 
  [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]  [0.025] [0.025] [0.023] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] 
EZ10p1  0.074*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.082***  0.072*** 0.072*** 0.064*** 0.085*** 0.070*** 0.112*** 0.068*** 
  [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021]  [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021] 
EZ10p2  0.113*** 0.092*** 0.097*** 0.135***  0.114*** 0.106*** 0.117*** 0.125*** 0.097*** 0.156*** 0.107*** 
  [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]  [0.023] [0.023] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.022] [0.023] 
EZ01p1  0.085*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.093***  0.080*** 0.089*** 0.070*** 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.102*** 0.081*** 
  [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026]  [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] 
EZ01p2  0.120*** 0.119*** 0.114*** 0.125***  0.115*** 0.125*** 0.109*** 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.128*** 0.110*** 
  [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]  [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
lnRGDPx  0.590*** 0.628*** 0.528*** 0.689***  0.612*** 0.653*** 0.166  0.529*** 0.624*** 0.496*** 0.595*** 
  [0.089] [0.093] [0.081] [0.093]  [0.093] [0.096] [0.102] [0.099] [0.093] [0.093] [0.097] 
lnRGDPx  1.185*** 1.192*** 1.147*** 1.259***  1.175*** 1.149*** 1.426*** 1.204*** 1.185*** 1.144*** 1.131*** 
  [0.078] [0.082] [0.079] [0.081]  [0.083] [0.087] [0.101] [0.086] [0.082] [0.081] [0.085] 
lnREXRxm -0.189*** -0.213*** -0.157**  -0.231***  -0.178**  -0.192*** -0.163**  -0.130*  -0.205*** -0.128*  -0.162** 
  [0.066] [0.069] [0.069] [0.070]  [0.070] [0.070] [0.067] [0.071] [0.069] [0.070] [0.069] 
lnREXRcm -0.297*** -0.270*** -0.344*** -0.259***  -0.301***  -0.289*** -0.286*** -0.365*** -0.292*** -0.395*** -0.313***
  [0.094] [0.098] [0.100] [0.098]  [0.100] [0.099] [0.096] [0.100] [0.098] [0.098] [0.097] 
lnREXRxm-1 -0.605*** -0.568*** -0.592*** -0.607***  -0.635***  -0.608*** -0.613*** -0.612*** -0.608*** -0.537*** -0.634***
  [0.067] [0.069] [0.070] [0.069]  [0.071] [0.070] [0.066] [0.073] [0.069] [0.069] [0.069] 
lnREXRcm-1  0.392*** 0.360*** 0.341*** 0.413***  0.409*** 0.393*** 0.406*** 0.413*** 0.402*** 0.319*** 0.409*** 
  [0.091] [0.094] [0.095] [0.094]  [0.096] [0.096] [0.088] [0.100] [0.095] [0.093] [0.094] 
              
Observations  4161 3744 3744 3744  3744 3744 3744 3744 3744 3762 3744 
Panels  380 342 342 342  342 342 342 342 342 342 342 
R-squared  0.53 0.51 0.50 0.54  0.51 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.49 
              
OLS, robust standard errors in brackets                 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
              
                            
 Denmark  Sweden  U.K.  Norway  Switzerland Australia  Canada  Japan 
New 
Zealand  U.S.A. 
              
EZ11p1  0.224*** 0.140*** 0.148*** 0.155*** 0.149***  0.157*** 0.194*** 0.171*** 0.139***  0.152*** 
  [0.025] [0.029] [0.028] [0.027] [0.025]  [0.023] [0.023] [0.025] [0.023]  [0.025] 
EZ11p2  0.330*** 0.219*** 0.181*** 0.215*** 0.206***  0.249*** 0.258*** 0.228*** 0.221***  0.220*** 
  [0.027] [0.030] [0.029] [0.027] [0.025]  [0.023] [0.025] [0.025] [0.023]  [0.025] 
EZ10p1  0.133*** 0.042  0.056**  0.068*** 0.053**  0.071*** 0.102*** 0.085*** 0.046**  0.065*** 
  [0.023] [0.025] [0.026] [0.022] [0.022]  [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.020]  [0.022] 
EZ10p2  0.205*** 0.081*** 0.064**  0.117*** 0.082***  0.121*** 0.136*** 0.112*** 0.092***  0.105*** 
  [0.025] [0.028] [0.028] [0.024] [0.024]  [0.023] [0.024] [0.025] [0.021]  [0.024] 
EZ01p1  0.128*** 0.072**  0.068**  0.080*** 0.070**  0.071*** 0.127*** 0.088*** 0.070***  0.076*** 
  [0.025] [0.032] [0.032] [0.030] [0.028]  [0.023] [0.024] [0.027] [0.026]  [0.027] 
EZ01p2  0.170*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.117*** 0.091***  0.147*** 0.153*** 0.107*** 0.123***  0.106*** 
  [0.028] [0.033] [0.033] [0.029] [0.028]  [0.025] [0.027] [0.028] [0.024]  [0.028] 
lnRGDPx  0.631*** 0.626*** 0.621*** 0.590*** 0.583***  0.586*** 0.680*** 0.537*** 0.594***  0.554*** 
  [0.092] [0.094] [0.093] [0.092] [0.090]  [0.093] [0.090] [0.099] [0.095]  [0.090] 
lnRGDPx  1.139*** 1.239*** 1.195*** 1.161*** 1.131***  1.120*** 1.184*** 1.219*** 1.280***  1.183*** 
  [0.077] [0.081] [0.082] [0.081] [0.081]  [0.079] [0.082] [0.084] [0.081]  [0.083] 
lnREXRxm -0.218***  -0.230*** -0.181**  -0.196*** -0.094  -0.116* -0.193*** -0.261*** -0.249***  -0.260***
  [0.066] [0.071] [0.076] [0.069] [0.072]  [0.066] [0.068] [0.078] [0.076]  [0.074] 
lnREXRcm  -0.263*** -0.247**  -0.344*** -0.292*** -0.376***  -0.286*** -0.303*** -0.227**  -0.276***  -0.224** 
  [0.096] [0.098] [0.107] [0.094] [0.104]  [0.096] [0.097] [0.109] [0.102]  [0.105] 
lnREXRxm-1 -0.588*** -0.592*** -0.611*** -0.592*** -0.708***  -0.666*** -0.555*** -0.548*** -0.624***  -0.576***
  [0.067] [0.071] [0.078] [0.070] [0.072]  [0.064] [0.068] [0.078] [0.075]  [0.076] 
lnREXRcm-1  0.378*** 0.379*** 0.387*** 0.330*** 0.477***  0.392*** 0.367*** 0.327*** 0.473***  0.456*** 
  [0.092] [0.097] [0.105] [0.093] [0.103]  [0.092] [0.094] [0.105] [0.100]  [0.103] 
              
Observations  3744 3744 3744 3744 3744  3744 3744 3744 3744  3744 
Panels  342 342 342 342 342  342 342 342 342  342 
R-squared  0.55 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.54  0.55 0.54 0.53 0.55  0.51 
              
Country  pair  fixed  effects            
Controls for deviation from trend GDP, Single Market participation and common year effects 
 
 Table A5   Robustness check: Exclusion of individual countries (sample of 13 EU countries)       
              
 Total  Austria  Belgium  Finland  France  Germany Ireland  Italy  Holland  Portugal  Spain 
              
EZ11p1  0.114*** 0.109*** 0.122*** 0.108***  0.108*** 0.118*** 0.091*** 0.107*** 0.144*** 0.149*** 0.095*** 
  [0.032] [0.033] [0.034] [0.033]  [0.033] [0.033] [0.031] [0.034] [0.033] [0.032] [0.033] 
EZ11p2  0.187*** 0.188*** 0.174*** 0.206***  0.203*** 0.189*** 0.181*** 0.182*** 0.194*** 0.199*** 0.155*** 
  [0.037] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038]  [0.038] [0.038] [0.035] [0.038] [0.037] [0.037] [0.038] 
EZ10p1  0.032 0.024 0.030 0.038  0.023 0.029 0.020 0.039 0.035 0.082**  0.015 
  [0.033] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034]  [0.034] [0.034] [0.033] [0.034] [0.034] [0.032] [0.033] 
EZ10p2  0.052 0.030 0.050 0.072* 0.058 0.037 0.069*  0.059 0.045 0.090**  0.026 
  [0.039] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040]  [0.040] [0.040] [0.037] [0.040] [0.039] [0.038] [0.039] 
EZ01p1  0.053 0.053 0.066*  0.051  0.048 0.058*  0.039 0.042 0.067*  0.059*  0.043 
  [0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034]  [0.035] [0.034] [0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.033] [0.034] 
EZ01p2  0.086** 0.092** 0.094** 0.090**  0.087** 0.092** 0.084** 0.074*  0.100** 0.078** 0.063 
  [0.040] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042]  [0.042] [0.042] [0.039] [0.042] [0.041] [0.039] [0.041] 
lnRGDPx  0.603*** 0.643*** 0.432*** 0.740***  0.607*** 0.687*** -0.084  0.490*** 0.637*** 0.509*** 0.540*** 
  [0.117] [0.127] [0.084] [0.123]  [0.127] [0.133] [0.138] [0.135] [0.125] [0.126] [0.142] 
lnRGDPx  1.198*** 1.237*** 1.145*** 1.308***  1.185*** 1.131*** 1.154*** 1.289*** 1.149*** 1.218*** 1.081*** 
  [0.104] [0.113] [0.105] [0.108]  [0.114] [0.122] [0.142] [0.119] [0.111] [0.107] [0.121] 
lnREXRxm -0.320*** -0.330*** -0.306*** -0.404***  -0.334***  -0.356*** -0.321*** -0.297**  -0.320*** -0.160  -0.350***
  [0.113] [0.122] [0.113] [0.118]  [0.126] [0.123] [0.098] [0.132] [0.117] [0.129] [0.123] 
lnREXRcm  -0.161 -0.157 -0.147 -0.018  -0.173 -0.083 -0.061 -0.204 -0.270*  -0.396**  -0.074 
  [0.153] [0.163] [0.171] [0.161]  [0.170] [0.167] [0.142] [0.174] [0.159] [0.167] [0.166] 
lnREXRxm-1 -0.595*** -0.500*** -0.577*** -0.573***  -0.702***  -0.570*** -0.677*** -0.571*** -0.633*** -0.469*** -0.640***
  [0.108] [0.115] [0.114] [0.113]  [0.120] [0.117] [0.096] [0.132] [0.112] [0.116] [0.114] 
lnREXRcm-1  0.464*** 0.388**  0.299*  0.393**  0.606*** 0.430**  0.493*** 0.544*** 0.578*** 0.409**  0.520*** 
  [0.157] [0.171] [0.170] [0.168]  [0.174] [0.172] [0.141] [0.191] [0.164] [0.164] [0.169] 
              
Observations  1704 1441 1441 1441  1441 1441 1441 1441 1441 1452 1441 
Panels  156 132 132 132  132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
R-squared  0.65 0.64 0.64 0.67  0.64 0.64 0.68 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.59 
              
OLS, robust standard errors in brackets                 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
              
                            
  Denmark  Sweden  U.K.           
              
EZ11p1  0.261***  0.048  0.030           
  [0.035]  [0.037]  [0.047]           
EZ11p2  0.425***  0.137**  -0.001           
  [0.027]  [0.057]  [0.035]           
EZ10p1  0.193***  -0.038  -0.061           
  [0.036]  [0.038]  [0.049]           
EZ10p2  0.305***  -0.006  -0.141***          
  [0.031]  [0.059]  [0.039]           
EZ01p1  0.161***  0.031  -0.033           
  [0.035]  [0.039]  [0.050]           
EZ01p2  0.232***  0.067  -0.040           
  [0.030]  [0.063]  [0.042]           
lnRGDPx  0.754***  0.653***  0.695***           
  [0.125]  [0.128]  [0.126]           
lnRGDPx  1.085***  1.326***  1.217***           
  [0.091]  [0.106]  [0.113]           
lnREXRxm  -0.389***  -0.320**  -0.264*           
  [0.117]  [0.130]  [0.159]           
lnREXRcm  -0.075  -0.204  -0.239           
  [0.157]  [0.173]  [0.220]           
lnREXRxm-1  -0.462***  -0.640*** -0.581***          
  [0.112]  [0.125]  [0.157]           
lnREXRcm-1  0.357**  0.500***  0.362           
  [0.161]  [0.180]  [0.239]           
              
Observations  1441  1441  1441           
Panels  132  132  132           
R-squared  0.68  0.65  0.66           
              
Country  pair  fixed  effects            
Controls for deviation from trend GDP, Single Market participation and common year effects 
 
 
 Table A6   Currency union effects in ISIC sectors and industries                  (Sample of 20 OECD countries)         
              
  Total  01 - 05  10 - 12 
13 – 
14  15 - 16  17 - 19  20  21  22  23 
24 - 
2423 2423 25 
                 
EZ11p1  0.165***  0.062 -0.881** -0.112  0.069*  0.011  0.289**  0.165 0.094*  0.045 0.048 0.265***  0.198*** 
  [0.023] [0.090] [0.432]  [0.223]  [0.036] [0.039] [0.143] [0.140] [0.056] [0.367] [0.060] [0.074] [0.041] 
EZ11p2  0.232*** 0.092  0.772*  0.010  0.050  0.027  0.422*** 0.169  0.116**  0.135  0.178*** 0.586*** 0.169*** 
  [0.024] [0.082] [0.395]  [0.204]  [0.038] [0.042] [0.134] [0.129] [0.055] [0.334] [0.066] [0.079] [0.040] 
EZ10p1 0.074***  0.002  -0.491  0.013  -0.009  -0.029  0.066  -0.016  0.119***  -0.318  -0.012  0.211***  0.122*** 
  [0.020] [0.093] [0.393]  [0.222]  [0.035] [0.035] [0.136] [0.116] [0.046] [0.342] [0.047] [0.067] [0.039] 
EZ10p2 0.113***  0.115  0.463  -0.021  -0.009  -0.083**  0.307**  -0.046  0.011  0.237  -0.027  0.386***  0.109*** 
  [0.022] [0.089] [0.393]  [0.184]  [0.035] [0.037] [0.122] [0.108] [0.049] [0.322] [0.053] [0.071] [0.036] 
EZ01p1  0.085***  -0.008  -0.106  -0.294  0.040 0.004  0.245 0.101 -0.072  -0.007  0.086 0.095 0.202*** 
  [0.025] [0.070] [0.405]  [0.263]  [0.037] [0.045] [0.178] [0.186] [0.069] [0.362] [0.084] [0.088] [0.046] 
EZ01p2  0.120*** -0.044  0.540  -0.165 -0.096** -0.086*  0.343*  0.121  -0.130** 0.268  0.253*** 0.345*** 0.143*** 
  [0.026] [0.066] [0.368]  [0.238]  [0.039] [0.048] [0.177] [0.161] [0.061] [0.341] [0.090] [0.095] [0.044] 
                 
Observations 4161 4161 4161  4161  4161 4161  4161 4161 4161 4161 4161 4161 4161 
Panels  380 380 380  380  380 380  380 380 380 380 380 380 380 
R-squared  0.53 0.07 0.03  0.02  0.38 0.20 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.31 0.15 0.35 0.25 
                 
Legends                
01-05  AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND FISHING 
10-12  MINING AND QUARRYING OF ENERGY PRODUCING MATERIALS 
13-14  MINING AND QUARRYING EXCEPT ENERGY PRODUCING MATERIALS 
15 – 16  FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 
17 – 19  TEXTILES, TEXTILE PRODUCTS, LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR 
20  WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK 
21  PULP, PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS 
22  PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 
23  COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL 
24 - 2423  CHEMICALS EXCLUDING PHARMACEUTICALS 
2423 PHARMACEUTICALS   
25  RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS 
 
   26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
             
EZ11p1  0.158  0.286**  0.181*** 0.183*** 0.097  0.135*** 0.153**  0.127*** 0.221  0.221  0.143*** 
  [0.106] [0.118] [0.040] [0.031] [0.077] [0.046] [0.073] [0.038] [0.151] [0.151] [0.055] 
EZ11p2  0.254*** 0.210*  0.310*** 0.253*** 0.084  0.150*** 0.351*** 0.166*** 0.482*** 0.482*** 0.151*** 
  [0.091] [0.113] [0.043] [0.031] [0.073] [0.044] [0.078] [0.040] [0.147] [0.147] [0.054] 
EZ10p1 0.121 0.209**  0.081**  0.029 -0.093  0.097**  -0.019  0.036 0.148 0.148 0.089* 
  [0.083] [0.092] [0.037] [0.027] [0.068] [0.048] [0.062] [0.033] [0.150] [0.150] [0.047] 
EZ10p2  0.163**  0.154*  0.192*** 0.084*** -0.015  0.111**  -0.001  0.095*** 0.489*** 0.489*** 0.105** 
  [0.077] [0.086] [0.037] [0.028] [0.063] [0.046] [0.068] [0.035] [0.157] [0.157] [0.047] 
EZ01p1 0.282*  0.298*  0.108***  0.145***  0.212***  0.059 0.129*  0.017 0.189 0.189 0.144** 
  [0.152] [0.165] [0.041] [0.036] [0.072] [0.048] [0.069] [0.039] [0.152] [0.152] [0.069] 
EZ01p2  0.406*** 0.445*** 0.188*** 0.131*** 0.215*** 0.153*** 0.311*** 0.021  0.490*** 0.490*** 0.238*** 
  [0.123] [0.155] [0.043] [0.034] [0.068] [0.046] [0.072] [0.041] [0.134] [0.134] [0.065] 
             
Observations 4161 4161 4161 4161 4161 4161 4161 4161 4161 4161 4161 
Panels  380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 
R-squared  0.07 0.07 0.19 0.35 0.24 0.28 0.21 0.44 0.11 0.11 0.18 
             
OLS,  robust  standard  errors  in  brackets          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
             
Country  pair  fixed  effects           
Controls for capacity (=total sector/industry exports), industry specific real exchange rates, deviations from trend GDP and common year effects 
  
26  OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 
27 BASIC  METALS 
28  FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, except machinery and equipment 
29  MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, N.E.C. 
30  OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND COMPUTING MACHINERY 
31  ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND APPARATUS, NEC 
32 RADIO,  TELEVISION  AND  COMMUNICATION  EQUIPMENT 
33  MEDICAL, PRECISION AND OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS 
34  MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILERS 
35  OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
36 FURNITURE;  MANUFACTURING,  N.E.C. 
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